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Introduction 
Ever since Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society was published in 1992, claiming that 
technological development is the source of social conflicts is quite a trivial statement 
in social sciences. Over the last few years we’ve had the chance to watch quite a few 
technology-related conflicts, such as the GMO issue, the BSE crisis or the bird flu. 
What is more, some„classical”  technological conflicts which could seem no longer 
current at present turn out to be still at stake: discussions concerning nuclear energy 
seem to be even more lively, especially since the debate over global warming made 
some governments of states look more closely into the atomic problem. New conflicts 
are still to come as we keep developing more innovative technologies, such as 
nanotechnologies or reproductive medicine.     
The scale of technological conflicts shows that modern societies still have a 
problem with solving them and controlling their course. It seems that we could not 
find many examples of technological conflicts in the past which have been solved, or 
at least ended peacefully, as the social tension caused by technological development 
has been effectively cooled down. This is why it is so important to understand the 
nature of present conflicts caused by modern technologies and to analyse their 
dynamics from the sociological point of view. 
   The purpose of this article is to present a model describing the defining 
strategies taken by the participants of technological conflicts in order to solve them. 
We have called it a reductive model as it is based on reduction procedures such as 
reducing conflict complexity, reducing risk and reducing ignorance. 
 The first step will be to introduce some basic ideas concerning technological 
conflicts and the reductive conflict-solving model. Then, we will refer to the sociology 
of scientific ignorance which offers theoretical background for analyzing reduction 
processes. The next stage will be to introduce two risk-reduction degrees and three 
conflict redefining stategies used in our model. Finally, we will present a catalog of 
reduction techniques within each strategy.   
Technological conflict 
A „technological conflict” will be defined here as a kind of social conflict originating 
from a social debate over the consequences of using a certain technology. Using (or 
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ceasing to use) it is perceived as threatening the interests of at least one actor of the 
conflict.  Some examples of technological conflicts are presented in Table 1.  
 
Issue at 
stake Conflicted parties Examples 
Using nuclear 
energy 
Ecologists, local communities, some 
political parties vs. energy industry, 
governments of states, scientists 
Dispute over the construction of 
new nuclear power plants 
Power plant waste transport 
through Germany 
Local protests concerning the 




Part of the public and the media, religious 
groups, some governments of states vs. 
biotechnological concerns, scientists 
Prohibiting the cloning 
procedure and certain kinds of 





Farmers, ecologists, part of the public vs. 
biotechnological concerns, governments of 
states  
UE vs. USA and WTO 
 
GMO-free region campaign in 
Europe 
Attempts to prevent the 
cultivation of GMO in the UE 
Regulating 
water systems 
Ecologists, part of the public and the media 
vs. governments of states 
Constructing dams and artificial 
water reservoirs  
Global warming UE, ecologists, the public vs. USA, Russia, 
China, India, the industrial sector 
The Kyoto protocol 
Mobile phones Part of the public, local communities, some 
scientists vs. telecommunication 
companies, state administration and 
scientists 
Local disputes over the 
construction of telephone masts 
BSE  Great Britain vs. UE, UE vs. USA, the 
public and the media vs. governments of 
states and cattle breeders 
BSE disease in Europe in the 
90’s 
Cure for AIDS  Governments of some African states vs. 
WHO and medical concerns 
Doubts concerning the usage of 
AIDS medicines. Patent issue 
Table 1. Some examples of technological conflicts 
 
The model presented in this article is based on the assumption that the 
complexity of technological conflicts is one of the reasons why they are so difficult to 
solve. The complexity results from the fact that many modern technologies, and 
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especially ”converging technologies”, interfere with our social life and transform it in 
quite a new way. As a result, technological conflicts are not (as the deficit model of 
Public Understanding of Science Model would like to see it) simple conflicts 
stemming from the fears shared by parts of the society, afraid of possible negative 
effects (real or imagined) of introducing certain new technologies, such as genetic 
engineering or using stem cells to generate organs. Technological conflicts concern 
the very nature of social change caused by the technological innovations (cf. Felt, 
Wynne 2007). We could say that they start when people become aware of the fact 
that the products of technological progress are not innocent tools, used in order to 
make our life easier and more pleasant, but an important factor stimulating social 
change and influencing both social life, the choices we make for the future, the types 
of human relationships and the relationship between human beings and nature. 
According to Ulrike Felt et al., 2007, innovations generated by science are never 
purely technological. Their nature is always both social and technical. On one hand, 
they can be implemented effectively only when the structure and organization of the 
society are “compatible” with the very nature of each innovation. On the other hand, 
through their implementation and development, innovations always cause a change 
in the social context.  As a result, as Felt et al. point out,  describing modern fears 
caused by technological progress cannot be reduced to the notion of risk. These 
fears concern the nature and the consequences of each implemented innovation.    
The fact that technological conflicts go beyond the pure notion of risk makes them 
become even more complex and multi-dimensional, as we are dealing 
simultaneously with many different issues (their harmfulness, moral and ethical 
issues, political and economic problems, group interests, individual rights, etc.). Their 
complexity makes them difficult to solve, which is why we can assume that one of the 
basic strategies of each conflicted party will be to reduce the technological conflict 
according to their interests. The present paper is an attempt to look at the dynamics 
of technological debates using a reductive conflict-solving model, which should be 
helpful in describing and understanding their nature.  
The theoretical background for the model will be based on some elements of 
Pierre Bourdieu’s symbolic fields theory. Reducing conflict complexity consists on 
attempting to validate the definition of the technology at stake, formulated by each 
participant of the conflict. These definitions include technology’s mechanisms, its 
consequences, its risks, but also the postulated hierarchy of goals and values, the 
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types of human relations, development projects, visions of the future, desired forms 
of social structure and visions of “good life”. In other words, participants of 
technological conflicts present  wholesome definitions of reality resulting from the 
implementation of each socio-technological innovation, and try to validate them. 
At this point, we could refer to Ulrich Beck’s theory of „ structures of defining” 
which he compared to the functioning of production relations in the industrial 
societies. 
 The power to define and say what is harmful and what is not, to what extent and 
beginning from what amounts, how to behave in the face of possible dangers, and 
how to control and regulate them, is one of the most fundamental political resources. 
This is because of the nature of the dangers themselves which are always 
symbolically mediated and can therefore only be cognised indirectly. As Beck wrote 
in Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (1992: 27): 
That which impairs health or destroys nature is not recognizable to one’s 
own feeling or eye, and even where it is seemingly in plain view, qualified 
expert judgment is still required to determine it ‘objectively’. Many of the 
newer risks (nuclear or chemical contaminations, pollutants in foodstuffs, 
diseases of civilization) completely escape human powers of direct 
perception. The focus is more and more on hazards which are neither 
visible nor perceptible to the victims; hazards that in some cases may not 
even take effect within the lifespan of those affected, but instead during 
those of their children; hazard in any case that require the ‘sensory organs’ 
of science – theories, experiments, measuring instruments – in order to 
become visible or interpretable as hazards at all. 
It seems, though, that Beck’s concept of defining risk does not allow to see the 
complexity of technological conflicts and concentrates too much on the harmfulness 
of each technology (see also Lau 1991).  
According to Bourdieu’s theory, technological conflicts can be seen as struggling 
to validate the definitions of reality presented by each conflicted party. The struggle 
concerns different domains, depending on the nature of each conflict, and may 
include an attempt to prevent validating a certain definition of reality within one 
domain and shift it into another. It is the case of so-called “medicalisation” processes, 
when the definition of life, its beginning and its end is no longer an ethical, moral or 
religious issue and becomes a purely medical problem (which actually means that it 
has been shifted from one domain into another).       
 Struggling to validate one’s definition of reality often concerns the right to 
define some new phenomena resulting from technological progress. Several 
 6 
questions arise that could serve as examples, such as: how to interpret the transplant 
technologies?; which domain to use for describing nanotechnologies?; is growing 
GMO’s an economic, political, scientific or rather ethical issue?, etc.  
The objective of each definition of reality presented by conflicted parties is to 
cover all controversial phenomena and to gain exquisite rights to define them. As a 
result, the complexity of the problem is being reduced in a way that suits the needs of 
each actor. This is why developing countries will view the global warming dispute as 
a purely economic problem, putting aside its ecological aspect. Some African 
countries will tend to perceive propagating condoms and the anti-HIV campaign as a 
reflection of political relations between the North and the South, ignoring the health 
problem (and, therefore, defining AIDS as nothing but an illusionary threat). The 
Catholic church will perceive abortion as breaking religious rules, ignoring the social 
aspect of the problem.      
Struggling for the right to define requires specific defining strategies which aspire 
to influence the form of the conflict and the way it is solved. As a result, the conflict is 
being redefined in a way that reflects the interests of the actor: technological conflict 
now becomes economic, ecological or scientific. The diagram below presents the 
reductive conflict-solving model presented in this article. 
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Fig. 1 Reductive model of solving technological conflicts 











 Precaution strategy 
REDEFINING THE CONFLICT 




The sociology of scientific ignorance 
The sociology of scientific ignorance (SSI) sprouted from the sociology of 
scientific knowledge (SSK) in the early nineteen-eighties (Stocking 1998). It did not 
aspire to replace the existing research tradition. What it wanted to do was expand 
this tradition and complement it with a previously ignored dimension, the “shadow-
side of knowledge” (Stocking), i.e., what science did not know. Rather than being a 
new sub-discipline of the sociology of knowledge, it was a redirection. Several works 
emerged within this new current, most of them theoretical (cf. Smithson 1985, 1989, 
1993; Ravetz 1986, 1987, 1990; Funtowicz & Ravetz 1991; Stocking & Holstein 
1993; Beck 1996; Michael 1996; Walton 1996; Japp 1997; Stocking 1998; Böschen 
2000; Wehling 2001, 2004).1 
This idea is based on the observation that ignorance has lost its natural 
“innocence”, both epistemological and social: ignorance is no longer a natural state, 
a shadow zone dissipated by scientific discovery and a mere starting point for 
scientific endeavour, it is now problematised as a social construct, a product of 
knowledge-generating processes which serves specific political functions (Wehling 
2004: 36). This is how Peter Wehling describes the new approach to ignorance 
(2004: 36-37): 
Whoever reduces ignorance to the incognisability of natural relations is also 
reaching for a specific figure of argumentation and placing it in either the 
public or the scientific debate on the reasons for the lack of scientific 
knowledge. And by so doing he evokes the question of the meaning of 
“incognisability” (fundamentally incognisable? incognisable at this particular 
moment? incognisable due to insufficient scientific and technological 
advancement?) and the factors leading to this incognisability. 
The reasons for incognisability are sought not in the nature of reality itself but in 
the institutional and methodological barriers within science and its environment. As in 
the sociology of scientific knowledge, where scientific knowledge is not viewed as 
something which is objectively given in nature and merely discovered by scientists 
but as the outcome of specific social, knowledge-generating processes, so too 
scientific ignorance is viewed as the product of social relations. It is subject to 
negotiation among scientists and between scientists and other actors (sponsors, 
regulating and controlling institutions, consumers); as something which is moulded by 
specific interests and either modified and accepted or rejected. Placing ignorance on 
                                                 
1 For a discussion of ignorance from a different research perspective see: Luhman 1992; Merton 1987; Proctor 
1995; Sojak & Wicenty 2005. 
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the same analytic plane as scientific knowledge meant extension of the famous 
symmetry principle of the so-called strong program of sociology of knowledge. 
 Knowledge is not just the reverse of lack of knowledge, the realm of the yet 
unknown, reduced by scientific progress. On the contrary, researchers have coined 
the term “science-based ignorance” (Ravetz 1986), conceived as the realm of 
relevant ignorance generated by scientific and technological advancement. “Now we 
face the paradox that while our knowledge continues to increase exponentially, our 
relevant ignorance does so even more rapidly. And this is ignorance generated by 
science!” (Ravetz 1986: 423, after Wehling 2004: 44). This is how Ravetz specified 
his concept of ignorance generated by science: “This is an absence of necessary 
knowledge concerning systems and cycles that exist out there in the natural world, 
but exist only because of human activities. Were it not for our intervention, those 
things and events would not exist, and so our lamentable and dangerous ignorance 
of them is man-made as much as the systems themselves.” (1990: 217, after 
Wehling 2004: 44). 
Here the sociology of scientific ignorance touches a problem which is also 
important for the study of technology where the focus is on the fact that, as science 
and technology are developing, the range of technological interventions is becoming 
increasingly wider; hence on the one hand,  their possible consequences are 
becoming more and more far-reaching and on the other hand, they are becoming 
more and more difficult to foresee. 
To summarise the most salient aspects of the sociology of scientific ignorance 
from the point of view of the study of technological conflicts, we should draw attention 
to the fact that this is not sociology of ignorance in the strict sense but sociology of 
scientific ignorance.2 This observation seems to be based on the tacit assumption 
that once science has described and explained a phenomenon, this phenomenon is 
automatically known and passes from the realm of ignorance to the realm of 
knowledge. Meanwhile, as far as many features of today’s technologies are 
concerned, they remain within the domain of scientific ignorance despite the fact that 
they have been scientifically cognised (more on this later). In other words, they are 
                                                 
2 This is why Wehling is reluctant to identify ignorance with risk. He thinks that risk, i.e., the probability that 
certain consequences will take place, is situated within the cognitive horizon of science because science must 
first identify these possible consequences; ignorance, meanwhile, also involves lack of knowledge concerning 
the possible consequences of actions. Hence risk is scientifically founded and although it involves a considerable 
amount of uncertainty, this is not pure ignorance (Wehling 2004: 70-71). 
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invisible not because they continue to elude scientific cognisance but because they 
are subject to extra-scientific processes and phenomena. These processes and 
phenomena must be described if we want to gain a comprehensive view of the 
mechanisms of conflict reduction. 
This aspect of the sociology of scientific ignorance goes hand in hand with its 
epistemological attitude: the focus here is on the nature of scientific cognisance and 
the reasons why certain phenomena escape it whereas it seems to be only one of 
the many important questions concerning the development of areas of uncertainty, 
risk and ignorance in society. 
A third major aspect of the research paradigm we are discussing here is its focus 
on unintended and unconscious mechanisms of ignorance generation and lack of 
interest in the role of specific social actors and their interests in the social 
construction of ignorance (Wehling 2004: 55). A pertinent illustration of this approach 
is Wehling’s analysis of the history of Freon and its effect on the ozone layer. In his 
attempt to discover how it happened that for half a century nobody noticed that Freon 
was destroying the ozone layer Wehling completely ignores the interests of the 
producers of this substance. Even when he writes about the most controversial 
period, lasting more than a decade (from 1974 when it was first hypothesised that 
Freon might be harmful to publication of the Montreal protocol in 1987), he fails to 
see that one of the determinants of the prolonged questioning of the detrimental 
effect of Freon on the ozone layer was the strategy adopted by Freon’s main 
producer, DuPont concern, who consistently refused to accept this hypothesis until 
1986 (cf. Smith 1998). 
This is why it seems that, in a larger perspective and without contradicting the 
very nature of SSI, we could talk about the social construction of ignorance. Socially-
constructed ignorance will concern, for example, some diseases such as malaria, 
tuberculosis or cholera, which are called “neglected diseases3”. Their existence in 
today’s world is often explained by the fact that medical industry has no interest in 
doing any research on a cure or vaccine that could eliminate them. This situation 
results from the fact that these diseases concern mainly Third World countries which 
are not a target group for pharmaceutical concerns. Among all new medicines 
introduced on the market over the last decade, only 1% are supposed to cure tropical 
                                                 
3 See Public Library of Science (PLoS) Neglected Tropical Diseases, www.plosntds.org. 
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diseases. The persisting ignorance of the effective ways of fighting malaria turns out 
to be a social construct determined not only by the objective nature of reality (i.e. the 
complexity of the problem), but mainly be the interests of particular social groups.     
Reducing conflict complexity 
Definitions of reality formulated by the conflicted parties who are trying to validate 
them are based on a two-stage reduction:  
1. First-degree reduction: reducing conflict complexity to physical risk This 
stage consists on reducing the conflict to fears concerning the possible 
physical and biological hazards (a technology carries certain risks for 
human life and health and threatens the nature)  
2. Second-degree reduction: reducing ignorance which is part of the risk 
It may appear on two levels:  
- reducing uncertainty concerning the probability of certain damage 
- reducing ignorance concerning the nature and scale of possible 
damage. 
Second-degree reduction is based on the classical model of evaluating risk, 
where risk is the probability of certain damage: R (risk) = P (probability) x S (damage 
scale).  
Reducing ignorance consists on hiding the ignorance of one or two sides of the 
equation: the probability of damage (P) or its scale (S).   
As a result of first-degree reduction, the consequences of introducing a 
controversial technology are reduced to physical and biological phenomena. It is now 
possible to reduce a complex technological conflict to a debate over the harmfulness 
of each technology – a debate that can be solved by experts. 
Reducing conflict complexity, being the result of this operation, consists of 
refusing to acknowledge any issue that doesn’t concern physical risks or harmfulness 
and risk in general. One of the most important among the excluded issues is the 
innovative nature of a technology (in a broad, technical and social perspective).  
Second-degree reduction, performed after the conflict has been reduced to a 
debate over risk, excludes the risk itself from the definition of reality. It follows a zero-
one logic: the risk is presented using opposite pairs of “harmful”-“unharmful”. When 
ignorance of the probability of damage (P) and/or of their scale (S) is reduced to zero, 
we can be 100% sure that the phenomenon in question is unharmful. On the other 
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hand, reducing ignorance by transforming the probability of damage into the certainty 
of damage (P=1) and assuming a proper damage scale, we end up defining the 
phenomenon as clearly harmful.  
This procedure allows to reduce ignorance which was an obstacle in risk 
assessment. On the same time, though, the very notion of “risk” is being eliminated 
and reduced to “safety” or “danger”. As risk always involves at least some dose of 
ignorance, eliminating risk leads to reducing conflict complexity through minimizing 
ignorance. 
As a result of reducing the complexity of the conflict, certain aspects of the 
technology in question are simply being excluded, which leads to constructing 
ignorance.  If a conflicted party manages to validate their definition of reality based 
on a reduced image of the conflict, then the elements which had been excluded from 
the conflict discourse (and definitions of reality based on these elements) are shifted 
into what Bourdieu calls “social unconsciousness” and enlarge the domain of social 
ignorance.  
Defining strategies 
Reducing conflict complexity may be performed using one of three defining 
strategies: the strategy of declared safety, the strategy of declared harm and the 
precaution strategy. Each of these strategies is supposed to help a conflicted party 
validate their definition of reality, and therefore redefine the conflict in a way that suits 
their needs. The winning strategy will determine not only the final definition of a 
controversial phenomenon in the public discourse, but also the very nature of the 
conflict and the way it is solved.   
The strategy of declared safety and the strategy of declared harm perform the 
first-degree reduction in a similar way and reduce the conflict to physical risk. That 
way, all arguments which do not concern the physical harmfulness of the technology 
in question are simply not considered as valid. What is excluded is mainly the game 
of interests connected with the technology at stake, as well as the structural changes 
which could be caused by its implementation. 
Excluding the game of interests makes it possible to consider that the definitions 
of risk presented by conflicted parties reflect (more or less) the objective reality and 
do not depend on non-scientific factors. In other words, excluding the game of 
interests concerns hiding the social character of scientific knowledge.    
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However, ignoring the conflict of interests is not only connected with defining, but 
concerns structural consequences as well. Not talking about possible interests which 
could be supported or disturbed by a particular technological decision may have 
structural effects. For example, presenting the cultivation of GMO’s as a purely 
ecological problem, without taking into consideration the political and economic 
context (both local and international) leads to ignoring the major impact this 
technology has on agricultural production structure and on the balance of power in 
the society (see Seifert 2005).  
Apart from reducing the conflict to physical risk, the strategy of declared safety 
aimes at redefining the technology in question as safe, with the use of certain 
procedures of second-degree reduction (reducing ignorance). The objective here is to 
validate a definition of reality which considers the technology to be safe, and 
therefore, risk-free.     
The aim of the declared harm strategy is to redefine technological conflict as an 
economic conflict. The conflict is presented as a market game with its specific rules 
which concern consumer choice, freedom of market competition, calculating gains 
and losses, economic progress, etc. As risk has been excluded from discourse, every 
debate over the possible harmfulness of the technology seems useless. Profitability 
becomes the main criterion in making technological decisions. A technology is 
presented in the perspective of products entering the market whose fate should be 
decided by the consumers. A classic example of an economic conflict is the 
competition between technological solutions, each trying to set the global standards, 
e.g. the nearly finished competition between Blu-Ray and HD DVD systems, or the 
historical debate over VHS, Betamax and video 2000. The competition between 
Windows and Linux systems is also following the logic of an economic conflict. A 
conflict on the market doesn’t really involve any regulative state institutions whose 
only function is to ensure the freedom of competition.   
The strategy of declared harm goes in an opposite direction: after the conflict has 
been reduced to physical risk, the technology in question is being defined as clearly 
harmful, i.e. having inevitable and disastrous ecological consequences. That way, the 
conflict is being redefined and becomes an ecological one. It is now a conflict 
reduced to physical risk, concentrating mainly on possible hazards for human life and 
health and for the nature. No non-technical arguments are being taken into 
consideration. The criterion which is supposed to clear the controversies and solve 
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the conflict is the physico-biological harmfulness of the technology. Some examples 
of this type of defining strategies include the debates over localising waste disposals, 
power plants or factories polluting the environment, disputes over mobile phone 
industry and building telephone masts, or over the harmfulness of certain medicines.     
The third strategy is the precaution strategy, based on the precautionary principle. 
It states that, if there is doubt as to the possible harmfulness or serious change 
caused by the technology, we must continue to undertake actions aiming to prevent 
the destruction of natural environment, regardless of the cost and of the fact that the 
harmfulness is not yet a verified scientific fact (Levidow, Murphy 2003: 54).  
The precautionary principle is a direct answer to risks connected with 
technological innovations which has not yet been properly investigated. It is, 
therefore, a result of acknowledging our ignorance while introducing a new 
technology. Unlike the strategy of declared safety or declared harm, the precaution 
strategy does not reduce ignorance but makes it a starting point. The solution 
presented within this strategy is to refrain from using the technology in question until 
we obtain precise scientific data concerning its harmfulness or unharmfulness. 
Ignorance is not considered to be an immanent feature of modern technologies, but a 
transitory state which can be overcome with scientific progress. 
By referring to scientific judgement, the precaution strategy performs a first-
degree reduction, reducing social risk to physical risk (as scientific investigation can 
only concern what is physical). It leads to redefining technological conflict as a 
scientific conflict, which can be characterized as a conflict taking place within the 
domain of science and solved according to validation strategies typical for the 
scientific field. The precaution strategy shifts the controversial issue at stake into the 
domain of scientific judgement, removing the core of the conflict from the public 
discourse. As all actions concerning the use of the technology in question are being 
suspended, the technological conflict is being suspended as well, temporarily, until 
science provides a solution.      
Techniques and ways of reducing conflict complexity 
This part will present the most important techniques and ways of reducing conflict 
complexity used within each defining strategy. They will be treated altogether, as 
most of them are applicable for all three strategies. 
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 Risk naturalisation 
As we have stated before, the basic strategy of reducing conflict complexity is to 
reduce it to physical risk. This operation, which can be called naturalisation, is part of 
the risk-assessment process.   
One of the first steps in risk assessment is delineation of the area of occurrence 
of potential risk. In practice, risk is usually evaluated by representatives of the 
mathematical and natural sciences and within the frameworks of these sciences and 
therefore risk is usually reduced to the biological/physical dimension: possible 
harmfulness for the environment and human health is assessed but the social, 
political and economic consequences of implementation of a specific technology are 
not (cf. Seifert 2005). As Ulrich Beck (1992: 24) wrote: 
The debate on pollutant and toxic elements in air, water and foodstuffs, as 
well as on the destruction of nature and the environment in general, is still 
being conducted exclusively or dominantly in the terms and formulas of 
natural science. It remains unrecognized that a social, cultural and political 
meaning is inherent in such scientific ‘immerisation formulas’. 
We find a similar idea in Dorothy Nelkin’s work (1995: 453):  
Quality of life issue are discussed in terms of the physical requirements for 
a disputed facility or the accuracy of risk calculations rather than the needs 
or concerns of a community. Concerns about the morality of fetal research 
are reduced to debates about the precise point which life begins. 
Franz Seifert (2005) shows how the “hegemony” of physical risk has shaped the 
debate on the acceptability of producing genetically modified plants and this in turn 
has influenced the course of the conflict between the United States of America and 
the European Union on the World Trade Organisation Panel. According to Seifert, 
physical risk “becomes decisive in any kind of restrictive regulation, at national, 
supranational or international level. (…) As a consequence of physical risk hegemony 
scientific debates become the crucial conflict arenas” (ibid.: 367). 
We find a similar idea in Les Levidow et al.,  according to whom the conflict over 
GMO result from the fact that EU’s regulation policy concentrates on physical risk: 
„EU policy has defined agribiotechnology as an expert scientific issue, involving 
precaution, though kept separate from socio-ethical issues” (Levidow i in. 2005: 266). 
It contributes to the growing distrust and uneasiness of some part of the society, and, 
as a result, inflames the conflict.  
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Methodological rigour 
Another mechanism connected with scientific practice is used for reducing 
uncertainty, which is part of the second-degree reduction. The mechanism consists of 
expecting that science will provide clear evidence of the harmfulness or 
harmlessness of a technology or its products. Thus, we are facing the problem of 
interpreting results of scientific research which is very often not capable of 
determining whether the technology is harmful or safe, and can do nothing but point 
out the possibility of safety or damage.  
 Scientific results can therefore be interpreted as insufficient, inexact, 
uncertain, and therefore, unable to confirm the harmfulness of a technology (which is 
the strategy of declared safety). Expecting that scientific research will provide clear 
evidence of harmfulness may lead to questioning any non-100% evidence and to 
claiming that, due to lack of sufficient proof, the technology at stake can be 
considered as harmless. 
 On the other hand, the lack of proof of harmfulness can be interpreted within 
the strategy of declared harm in quite a different way, according to the principle 
stating that “lack of proof of harmfulness is not a proof of harmlessness”. This is why 
conflicted parties acting according to the strategy of declared harm will demand a 
scientific proof of harmlessness. However, the methodology of science clearly states 
that there is no such thing as a proof of harmlessness. Science may not observe any 
possible hazards, but it cannot proof their inexistence (or, as a matter of fact, the 
inexistence of anything).      
The strategy of precaution proposes quite a different solution to this problem. 
Instead of being reduced, ignorance is being accepted and made a starting point. 
The precaution strategy assumes, however, that sooner or later science will be able 
to overcome its limitations and provide sufficient knowledge for making proper 
decisions concerning the technology in question. 
Defining acceptable level of risk 
In order to determine whether something is harmful, we must first define the 
critical level which cannot be exceeded, otherwise the influence of a technology (e.g. 
the consequences of using a certain chemical substance or the electromagnetic 
radiation) can no longer be perceived as harmless.  On the other hand, it also means 
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that we determine the critical level of acceptable risk. We must remember that it is 
being determined not only based on scientific criteria, but also on the way people 
judge the phenomenon in question. In other words, defining the critical level of 
acceptable risk depends on the price that the society is willing to pay in order to 
ensure the desired level of safety.    
How can determining the acceptable level of risk contribute to the symbolic 
reduction of risk? According to our hypothesis, if risk level is being sanctioned, the 
society tends to treat anything below that level as harmless, and anything above it as 
harmful. As a result, we would be dealing with the social constructing of safety and 
danger described above, which excludes and reduces uncertainty (and also, risk).  
Let us look more closely into the elements of the process of determining the 
acceptable risk level.  This practice has been so fiercely criticised in risk theory (cf. 
e.g., Beck 1998, 1992; Wolf 1991; Scheer 1987; Conrad 1987) that here we will only 
list the most important factors which may contribute to the situation where risk 
becomes invisible. 
According to Jens Scheer (1987), the very idea that “thresholds” can be 
established below which a substance is harmless and above which it suddenly 
becomes harmful was borrowed from radiation research. In this case it has actually 
been confirmed that radiation in excess of a specific limit will destroy protein particles 
and have toxic effects on living organisms. Thresholds marking the point of 
qualitative change are not universal, however. The relation between substance dose 
and its effect on the organism is often not linear. Yet it has become accepted practice 
to set threshold values for many substances, just as it is done for radiation (Scheer 
1987: 447). 
Ignoring the process of accumulation of various substances is the next way of 
symbolically neutralising risk. Acceptable levels are defined for one factor only. 
Meanwhile, substances are deposited in the human or animal organism and their 
effects accumulate. Add to this the practice of a single exposure to large doses and a 
single measurement of their effects instead of long-term exposure to small doses, 
often a much better model of what actually happens in real life (Wolf 1991: 396). 
Other things that have been subject to criticism are reliance on animal studies and 
transference of their findings to humans and the brevity of the studies which makes it 
impossible to identify all the effects of a substance. The latter is often forced on 
researchers by the logic of patent-based market competition which puts a premium 
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on original substance discoverers only. Concerns try to shorten the interval between 
the discovery and its introduction to the market as far as possible. 
Risk assessment is also often unable to take account of the delayed 
consequences of many technologies. Some of the adverse effects of nuclear 
radiation due to the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not apparent until the 
nineteen-sixties (Sheer 1987: 449). This delayed effect is one of the reasons why 
some pharmaceuticals are withdrawn from the market despite previous approval. 
Their adverse effects sometimes do not show up until the next generations (cf. 
Wehling 2004: 79-82). 
Some dangers are completely overlooked in risk evaluations because the number 
of known cases of adverse effects is too small. This could be the case, for example, 
with certain diseases which may be caused by in vitro fertilisation (cf. Schuh 2004). 
The conflict of interests 
Peter Weingart (2005) wrote that the changing status of science as an institution 
is one of the constitutive features of contemporary societies (information societies, 
knowledge societies). He thinks that we are witnessing the increasing overlapping or 
mutual dependency of science on the one hand and politics, the economy and the 
media on the other hand. This is leading to the development of new phenomena and 
processes at the science – politics – economy – media interface which are affecting 
the way things are done. Risk reduction is one of these new phenomena. 
One of the major determinants of the process whereby risk is reduced is the 
overlapping of science and big business. Science, both pure and applied, is 
becoming increasingly privatised and dominated by private concerns. Obviously, 
private economic agents who reap profit from new technologies are loathe to 
advertise the inherent risk. This is leading to conflict and tension between 
businessmen, public regulative institutions and public opinion. Scientists are the 
intermediaries in these conflicts. Unfortunately they are not always neutral although 
that is what is expected of them. Sheldon Krimsky gives many examples of the large 
scale of conflict of interest at the science – business – politics interface in his book 
Science in the Private Interest (2003). 
Krimsky draws attention to the role which advisory committees, appointed by 
governmental agencies, play. In the North American legal system they have very 
considerable influence on legislation and decision making processes. Naturally, they 
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should be objective, detached and, above all, not personally involved in the issues on 
which they are passing opinions. They should also be extremely highly qualified. In 
practice, however – Krimsky argues – these demands are often difficult to reconcile 
because highly qualified scientists usually also work for industry. Conflict of interests 
is therefore very common among governmental experts and advisors. 
Risk channelling and appropriation 
Risk is channelled, i.e., it is reduced to a selected fragment which can be 
submitted to political and/or economic, preferably monopolistic, control. This method 
diverts attention from other threats and gives the impression that the risk in question 
is under control. The so-called international emission trade, advertised as a way to 
limit global warming, may be an example. In this method, economic advantage is 
taken of a technological controversy so that the present technological progress can 
be left relatively intact while economic profit is gleaned from the situation. At the 
same time, public opinion receives the signal that the situation is under control and 
so is the risk, as attested to by the data on the development of the emission trade. 
A good illustration of this mechanism can be found in the famous analysis 
conducted by the French sociologist, Philippe Roqueplo, who took interest in the 
debate on forest death in Germany and its relation to introduction of compulsory 
equipment of cars with catalysers which took place in the early nineteen-eighties 
(Roqueplo 1986). Roqueplo demonstrated that, thanks to the way the political debate 
in the European Union was channelled, Germany managed to enforce a beneficial 
interpretation of the reasons for forest death and gain economic advantage. Only 
private cars were “accused” and other possible causes, such as SO2 emission 
caused by industry, electric power plants and trucks and lorries were rejected. By 
channelling the problem this way, Germany, the world’s leading producer of 
catalysers, could take advantage of the obligation to install them in cars.4 
Withholding information about risk 
The next type of methods adopted to make risk invisible is withholding information 
in the strict sense. This is an example of conscious and deliberate action whose 
purpose is to prevent information about the dangers of a particular technology 
                                                 
4 A similar case persisted in Poland for many years thanks to Kazimierz Grabek, the monopolist in the 
production of gelatin who successfully lobbied for bans on import or higher customs duty on gelatin or its 
components under the pretext of the risk of mad cow disease. 
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leaking out. As Dortohy Nelkin states, „Secrecy can be a way to divert criticism, 
reduce the intrusion of burdensome regulations, prevent panic, and avoid costly 
delays. (1995: 455). She refers to the situation, when after the Chernobyl accident 
federal agencies in the United Stated prohibited the energy agencies officials and 
some thousands of scientists working in state laboratories to comment on that case. 
„They feared that disclosure of information to the press would result in hasty and 
inappropriate public responses to the controversial American nuclear power program” 
(1995: 455).  
Another good illustration is the court battle waged in 2004-2006 between 
Greenpeace, the French group CRIIGEN (Committee for Independent Research and 
Genetic Engineering) and the Monsanto biotechnological concern. This last 
organisation refused to disclose the results of research which was the basis for 
applying for permission to import MON863, a genetically modified variety of maize 
produced by this concern. Everything began when a group of Le Monde journalists 
managed to gain access to data demonstrating that rats fed with this maize, which 
contained a toxic insecticide, developed severe blood and organ anomalies. The 
German branch of Greenpeace demanded that the concern reveal its research 
findings but Monsanto refused on the grounds of commercial confidentiality. In 2005 
the German court adjudged that the data must be disclosed, however (Greenpeace 
2007). 
Apparently such practices are frequent when publishing data on verified risk might 
threaten the actor’s economic interests. Another striking example is the history of the 
DuPont concern. In 2005 the Environmental Protection Agency accused DuPont of 
withholding information on the risk of using perfluorooctane acid (popularly called 
Teflon) for over 20 years. The company agreed to pay a 10 million dollar fine and 
allocate over 6 million dollars for environmental protection programs. This was the 
largest administrative fine the EPA had ever adjudged. That same year, Business 
Week magazine awarded DuPont the No. 1 of ‘the Top Green Companies” title 
(DuPont, Wikipedia). 
Discourse and risk exclusion 
The third area in which risk is made invisible is discourse which we shall now 
discuss. Radosław Sojak and Daniel Wicenty write in their book Lost reality. On the 
social construction of ignorance (2005: 69-84) that knowledge may be both an 
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instrument and an object of exclusion. This is why risk marginalisation or exclusion 
from legitimate discourse plays a crucial role in the process of conflict reduction and 
the number of mechanisms which operate in this area is so large that their discussion 
would exceed the confines of this article. Hence we shall focus on the most important 
ones. 
We propose to look at the problem of reducing risk in discourse through the 
perspective of three „exclusion procedures” presented in Michel Foucault’s  
Discourse on Language (1972). The first one is prohibition, based on the subject 
taboo (things we cannot talk about), the ritual (what can be said in which 
circumstances) and on the privileged position of certain speakers. It concerns both 
the content and the possible forms of discourse. 
The other procedure is the opposition of madness and reason, the rational and 
the irrational. In case of technological conflicts, we will be dealing with the separation 
of the scientific from the non-scientific and with setting standards of methodological 
accuracy. In a broader perspective, this opposition will also concern non-scientific 
rationality and manifest itself in statements such as “you cannot act against progress” 
or “progress cannot be stopped”.  
The third procedure presented by Foucault is the opposition of true and false, 
used as a rhetorical strategy and a tool  in fighting to control discourse (and define 
risk). In the context of technological conflicts, it is based on scientific discourse and 
can be used for the purposes of methodological rigour strategy.  
Discourse framing 
In her article Biotechnology and the Politics of Truth (2005) Sally Brookes 
analyses biotechnology from the perspective of various discourse frameworks which 
function within a given discourse formation. Discourse formation is understood as a 
historically originated system of discourse institutions and practices which define the 
discourse rules; situation within a specific fragment of the discourse formation says 
which cognitive perspectives, approaches and conceptualisations are acceptable and 
will give the ultimate meaning to specific statements and contents (Brookes 2005: 
363). 
In this perspective, the theory of discourse frameworks seems to be in 
accordance with Foucault’s exclusion procedure based on the opposition of reason 
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and madness. Placing a particular discourse framework depends on the commonly 
accepted criteria of determining what is reasonable and what is insane.  
Specific frames and practices are responsible for content inclusion/exclusion and 
framing. These frames integrate facts, theories, values and interests into cohesive 
structures. They say which discourse assumptions will be accepted as obvious and 
unquestionable. Brookes analyses the frames of the discourse on application of 
biotechnology in agriculture and points out their consequences for legitimisation of 
the GM food-based “green revolution”. 
As far as risk reduction is concerned, two frames are most crucial: the frame 
based on the assumption that “technology has its own trajectory” (ibid.: 363) and the 
assumption that “biotechnology is natural” (ibid.: 365). 
The first of these two assumptions views scientific and technological development 
as something inadvertent which progresses according to its own intrinsic logic and 
also as a politically neutral phenomenon which leads to more advantages than 
disadvantages. This frame ignores the aforementioned contemporary links between 
science, politics, the economy and the media. Possible adverse effects of 
technological development are excluded from this frame by relegating them (as 
“unscientific”) to the realm of political practice. 
The second frame, which declares biotechnological neutrality, habituates public 
opinion to the futuristic associations which bioengineering evokes by stressing that it 
is “really” simply a continuation of earlier technologies (“people always manipulated 
genes, e.g., by crossing animals or plants in order to obtain adequate varieties”). 
Maarten Hajer uses the concept of emblems to analyse ecological discourse. 
Emblems serve as a metaphor which helps to orient cognition and frame the problem 
(Hajer 1995: 19-21; cf. Lakoff & Johnson 1980). They symbolise the problem, attract 
most of the public opinion and concentrate discourse on themselves. Hajer gives 
examples of global warming and the ozone hole (the nineteen-eighties) which 
substituted the earlier nuclear power emblem (the nineteen-seventies) or the 
pesticide problem (the nineteen-sixties), the mainstays of ecological discourse in 
each consecutive period (Hajer 1995: 20). 
It seems, therefore, that the emblem concept may be viewed as an attempt to 
specify the theory of discourse frames: emblems function within discourse frames 
according to a given discourse formation’s super-ordinate rules of discourse. By 
concentrating the main body of discourse on itself, it helps to divert attention from 
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other issues. Hence the peculiar struggle to make a problem an emblem as attested 
to by the years-long attempts to pay more attention to the problem of global warming. 
Excluding people and information 
The next technique of reducing risk through discourse also refers to Foucault’s 
theory of „prohibition”. This time, it is about not allowing certain speakers to take part 
in discourse. Radosław Sojak and Daniel Wicenty think that exclusion of people who 
proclaim certain information is a way of excluding information from discourse (2005: 
69-84). “Exclusion of a person often leads to exclusion of certain information and the 
perspective on which it is founded” (ibid.: 78). Exclusion of people and information is 
based on the rule that “those whose values and norms have been defined as bad 
have no right to participate in the game which constructs social reality” (ibid.: 76). 
Sojak and Wicenty have analysed many works on social studies of science and the 
history of scientific controversies in search of examples of  such exclusion 
mechanisms (cf. also Barnes, Bloor & Henry, 1996; Collins & Pinch, 1998). But 
examples of this method can also be found in the technology discourse. Two 
examples from Polish press are Zbigniew Wojtasiński’s article under the telling title 
“The mad ecologist disease” (2003) and Włodzimierz Zagórski’s article “The new 
food magic” (2006) beginning with the words: “The opponents of genetically modified 
food are a new tribe of savages who believe in magic rather than science”. If 
someone is declared a savage in the very first sentence then how can we take what 
he says seriously? As Sojak and Wicenty say, “to control knowledge is to control 
people. The use of such control excludes people and their knowledge  from the 
community’s interpretative interplay and the process of creating social reality” (2005: 
79). 
The false symmetry strategy  
Another discourse strategy for the marginalisation and trivialisation of risk is to 
emphasise the controversial and ambiguous nature of a problem. The debate on 
global warming is an example of this strategy. This mechanism is particularly obvious 
in the United States of America where global warming is a major political issue, on 
both the international plane (the Kyoto Protocol) and the domestic plane (Al Gore’s 
campaign or Arnold Schwarzenegger’s “conversion” to ecologism). No wonder, 
therefore, that the belief that global warming has yet to be explained and the effect of 
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human activity on global climate change has still to be proven are upheld in public 
debate. One of the ways in which this is done is the media’s practice of quoting 
voices for and against global warming in equal proportions. This way, under the guise 
of journalist reliability and objectivity, the public is given the impression that scientists 
are divided in half on this issue. Things sometimes get even worse than this as when 
attempts are made to count the proponents and adversaries of each theory. For 
example, this is what Gary S. Becker, winner of the Nobel Prize for Economics, wrote 
in an article tellingly entitled “Global hypocrites” (2007: 50): 
Human kind’s responsibility for global warming is “very probable”. That is 
what more than 2.5 thousand researchers, authors of the recent UN 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) said. Not too few 
perhaps? At the same time 4 thousand other researchers signed the so-
called Heidelberg Appeal protesting against the alleged connection 
between human activity and warming of the climate. 
Sharon Begley argues that upholding controversy is a deliberate strategy adopted 
by PR specialists and conservative think tanks connected with the oil industry (2007). 
Rhetorical procedures  
Discursive reduction of conflict complexity includes a number of rhetorical 
procedures, such as „discourse-closing categories”, imputing ignorance, 
individualization, attachment, hierarchization and legalizing risk.  
“Discourse-closing categories” are incantations whose use by one of the 
adversaries causes discourse to reach its limits beyond which it cannot proceed any 
further. The aforementioned references to inadvertent or “no alternative” scientific 
progress, accusation of critics of certain technological solutions of the wish to “return 
to the caves”, or talk of the “necessary costs of progress”, all belong to this 
discourse-closure category. The side-effect category also serves a similar function: 
this category was used for a long time to tame the hazards of technological 
development. As long as they were viewed as potential side effects, they could be 
marginalised and treated as  “necessary evil”. 
Imputing ignorance involves excluding people and knowledge from discourse. It 
is based on the assumption that resistance to technological progress results from the 
lack of understanding of its true nature, i.e. from scientific ignorance. In other words, 
this method claims that every critical attitude towards a technology is caused by 
ignorance. As a logical conclusion, everyone who is against is simply an ignorant – if 
their weren’t ignorants, they wouldn’t be against. Imputing ignorance is a method 
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aiming to eliminate the opponents through claiming that „they are mistaken, as they 
do not know what they are doing” and that they are being manipulated by the 
ecologists or other demagogues. 
Individualization involves reducing risk to the level of individual actions and 
decisions. It leads to ignoring the key aspect of modern risk: its non-individual (or 
even global, as Beck would say) character. Instead, risk is being presented within the 
classical model of personal risk undertaken by each individual responsible for their 
actions. Referring to the concept of the “responsible citizen” is, according to Beck, 
“nothing more than cynicism used by the institutions to make their failure look more 
beautiful” (2007: 107). 
Hierarchization consists of creating a hierarchy of risks which suits the needs of 
each actor. In order to avoid a greater risk, it is possible to accept a less significant 
one. For example, introducing electronic monitoring systems in public places, as well 
as the implementation of advanced citizen-control systems is supposed to prevent a 
greater risk of crime and terrorism. Producing nuclear energy is explained by the 
need to stop the global warming, etc.    
Attachment involves making a connection between the technology at stake and 
an important social problem it’s supposed to solve. The development of one of the 
more controversial fields of biotechnology, so-called “green” biotechnology used in 
agriculture, is now being discussed together with the less controversial issues of 
“white” (industrial) and “red” (medical) biotechnology. It allows the GMO issue to be 
placed at the same level as the problem of fighting hunger in the world, producing a 
cure for cancer or transplanting organs. The attachment procedure is strictly 
connected with the hierarchization method and refers to the classical way of 
calculating risk which considered risks and chances. Using the attachment method is 
supposed to show that the risk in question is worth taking, as it will allow to avoid 
greater threats or will have a positive social effect. It also refers to the value of 
progress by presenting the technology as groundbreaking and very innovative. As a 
result, considering the possible gains, blocking the implementation of the technology 
at stake becomes irrational. 
Legalisation, i.e. referring to the legal character of the technology in question is a 
very common procedure within the strategy of declared safety. It is based on the 
assumption that, once the technology has been put to all necessary investigation and 
obtained a positive evaluation from the agencies and institutions created to assess 
 26 
risk, it must, therefore, be harmless. This method involves ignoring any doubts 
concerning the effectiveness and reliability of risk-assessment procedures. 
Conclusions 
The reductive model of solving technological conflicts presented in this article is 
nothing but a theoretical construct, a tool for describing the dynamics of technological 
conflicts and attempting to understand it. Concentrating on the mechanisms of 
constructing ignorance (through conflict reduction), it highlights the problem of 
excluding certain aspects of technological progress from the public discourse, which 
is the result of using different strategies of defining by the conflicted parties. Adopting 
this model allows us to analyze which elements are being excluded as each 
participant of the conflict formulates their own solution to the problem. However, it is 
also possible to think of a non-reductive, normative model of solving technological 
conflicts which would allow to avoid reduction and exclusion and would make it 
possible to analyze the whole complexity and multi-level character of problems 
related to technological innovations.  
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